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## THESIS

**AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF DEPLOYMENT ON  
TURNOVER IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE**

by

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This thesis addresses Army Reserve post-deployment turnover. Fifty-two prior Army Reservists who left the Reserves after their deployment were questioned in semi-structured telephone interviews. Survey questions were developed using motivation and turnover theories, and a Integrated Turnover Model relating a Reservist's deployment experience to the presence or absence of six major factors: involvement, demotivators, equity, reinforcement, reward relevance, and goals. Deficiencies were found in all six areas, with the most influential and interconnected determinant of post-deployment turnover stemming from poor leadership. Other commonly cited examples included: lack of timely deployment information, inefficient distribution of Reserve manpower, and inequitable treatment of Reserve by active members. Recommendations to reduce turnover include: revamp the Reserve officer leadership training and education program to emphasize exemplary moral behavior on the part of Reserve officers, straightforward communication of deployment dates, balance manning plans, and consider deploying Reservists from home sites.

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THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE**

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This thesis addresses Army Reserve post-deployment turnover. Fifty-two prior Army Reservists who left the Reserves after their deployment were questioned in semi-structured telephone interviews. Survey questions were developed using motivation and turnover theories, and an Integrated Turnover Model relating a Reservist's deployment experience to the presence or absence of six major factors: involvement, demotivators, equity, reinforcement, reward relevance, and goals. Deficiencies were found in all six areas, with the most influential and interconnected determinant of post-deployment turnover stemming from poor leadership. Other commonly cited examples included: lack of timely deployment information, inefficient distribution of Reserve manpower, and inequitable treatment of Reserve by active members. Recommendations to reduce turnover include: revamp the Reserve officer leadership training and education program to emphasize exemplary moral behavior on the part of Reserve officers, straightforward communication of deployment dates, balance manning plans, and consider deploying Reservists from home sites.



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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

### **A. BACKGROUND**

The end of the Cold War generated military budget constraints and downsizing that resulted in the active force having to increasingly rely on Reserve component support. Soon after, the Gulf War required the largest Reserve activation and mobilization since WWII. These events marked the beginning of a change in the mission for the Army Reserve, and its integration into the Department of Defense (DoD) Total Force Policy. The primary objectives of the Total Force Policy are to maintain a small, active, peacetime force, able to meet the National Military Strategy, and to integrate the capabilities of active and reserve forces into a more cost-effective fighting force. To meet these objectives, more combat support and combat service support capabilities have been transferred to the Reserve. Approximately 40 percent of the Army's support forces are currently in the Reserve (Kominiak, 1997).

With the increased reliance on the Army Reserve, unit readiness and deployability has become a vital concern to Army leadership. Historically, in order to be deployed, a combat unit had to meet or exceed a personnel readiness rating of 85 percent, and support forces had to meet or exceed a personnel readiness rating of 65 percent (Kominiak, 1997). A 1995 Rand Report identified that the average Reserve unit activated for the Gulf War had a personnel readiness rate of only 63 percent. The shortfall was due to unfilled positions (11%), and positions filled with soldiers waiting to complete training to be duty qualified (26%) (Kominiak, 1997). These shortfalls can be directly attributed to a high personnel turnover rate in the Reserves. Many of these losses can be linked to

turnover which occurs when reservists decide to leave their units after experiencing a deployment. A reduction in personnel turnover would ultimately result in budget savings, as well as an overall increase in total force readiness (Kominiak, 1997).

To address the issue of turnover, an integrated turnover model has been developed from generally accepted motivation and turnover management theories. This model contains elements of leadership style, reservist attitudes toward the Army Reserve, personal effects of the deployment experience, reward effectiveness, and equity issues. The model provides a framework to examine the turnover process as it applies to the context of the Army Reserve, and guides this study of the reasons reservists leave the unit after deployment.

## **B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH**

The two main objectives of this thesis are as follows:

1. Identify and analyze specific areas of dissatisfaction that deployment may cause for an individual and then determine if these concerns are influencing the Reservist's decision to leave the Army Reserve.
2. Recommend changes which should lead to decreased post deployment turnover and increased force readiness.

## **C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The primary research question is: How much of enlisted Army Reservists' decisions to leave can be attributed to deployments? The subsidiary research questions, organized to correspond to the integrated turnover model are:

### **Involvement**

1. What are the reservist's feelings toward the reasons for deployment?

2. Is the reservist able to commit to the mission, regardless of personal feelings?

#### **Demotivators**

1. How well did leadership assist in removing task/mission “roadblocks”?
2. Was the leadership powerless to aid reservists in task/mission accomplishment?
3. What are the effects of deployment on a reservists’ personal life e.g., family, civilian job, finances?

#### **Equity**

1. How well has the concept of ‘Total Force’ been implemented?
2. Do reservists perceive inequities because of their reserve status?

#### **Reinforcement**

1. Did leadership support the reservists, enabling them to complete their tasks to the best of their abilities?
2. Did reservists receive job performance feedback from leadership that enabled them to perform their jobs better?

#### **Relevance of Reward**

1. Did deployment awards serve to motivate reservists?
2. What kinds of awards do reservists think are desirable?

#### **Goals**

1. Did leadership make clear the goal/purpose of the jobs?
2. Did leadership use the promise of awards to motivate reservists?

### **D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS**

This thesis focuses on factors which lead enlisted members of the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) to leave their reserve units after a deployment experience. If the reservist has

not fulfilled his term of obligation, leaving a unit results in the reservist's involuntary transfer to the Inactive Ready Reserve (IRR). This study included involuntary transfers to determine the reasons reservists are willing to accept negative consequences, such as loss of rank, rather than risk being deployed again as well as those reservists who fulfilled their obligations but did not reenlist, choosing to forego the benefits of a military career rather than risk another deployment.

## **E. METHODOLOGY**

This study began with a literature review regarding the organization of the Reserve, its emerging role in national defense, and, finally, personnel issues impacting readiness. Next, a thorough study of relevant work motivation and turnover theories was conducted to develop a framework from which to explore the primary and subsidiary research questions. In turn, an interview protocol to capture data needed to answer the research question was designed. The method chosen to collect data was telephone interviews, consisting of qualitative, open-end questions which allowed opportunities to expand or probe responses. A sample of fifty-two telephone interviews with reservists who had left their units after a deployment was taken using the USAR database list. The results were then coded for entry into Excel for statistical analysis. The final procedure was to discuss the results of the statistical data analysis and provide recommendations to decrease deployment related turnover in the Reserve.

## **F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS**

This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter I introduces the topic and outlines the thesis' objectives, scope, limitations and research questions. Chapter II provides an overview of the Army Reserve, addressing composition of the force, the USAR'S

emerging role in the Total Force Policy, and discusses the problem of personnel turnover that results after a deployment experience. Chapter III discusses the theoretical framework of the study, and consists of a literature review of research relevant to the topic of personnel turnover. The discussion includes a general overview of motivational theory and turnover theory. These theories formed the framework of the study, and supported the development of an integrated turnover model which will be used to study the problem of turnover among reservists who have experienced deployment. Chapter IV explains the research methodology used to collect and analyze the data. Chapter V presents the data, and Chapter VI provides the discussion, conclusions, and recommendations.



## **II. BACKGROUND**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The first section of Chapter II introduces today's Army Reserve and provides an overview of the composition of the Reserve. The next section discusses unit deployment requirements, including a brief description of the readiness/deployment issues the Reserve experienced during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. The remaining section addresses the specific problem related to Reservists leaving their units (turnover) after a deployment experience, replacement costs, and the impact on unit readiness.

The mission of the Army Reserve is to "meet Department of the Army (DA) contingency operations or mobilization requirements" (Army Regulation 140-1, 1994). The drawdown has not lessened the potential from regional conflicts requiring the short notice deployment of large numbers of soldiers. Thus, the Army must increasingly rely on the Reserve to fill/augment force and mission requirement gaps.

Currently, the Reserve is the Army's primary source of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) assets (Kominiak, 7, 1997). They provide 30 percent of the Army's CS and 45 percent of the Army's CSS, as well as, 100 percent of the Army's training and exercise divisions 100 percent of its railway units and enemy prisoner of war brigades, and over 70 percent of the Army's medical and chemical capability (Plewes, 1997). The issue of Reserve readiness, specifically the reduction of enlisted turnover, then, is critical to our national military strategy.



## **B. ROLE OF THE SELECT RESERVE**

This section introduces the Army Reserve as it is comprised at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, beginning with a brief history of the Army Reserve.

### **1. Reserve History**

The United States Army Reserve (USAR) had its official birth on April 23, 1908, in an act "To Increase the Efficiency of the Medical Department of the United States Army." From this modest beginning and limited mission, the Army Reserve has grown into a force of almost a million men and women who are very much a part of today's Total Army (Currie et. al., xiii, 1997). The roots of the Army Reserve go back much further than 1908, however, for the concept of the citizen-soldier was an old one even at the time of the American Revolution.

The idea of supplementing Regular or full-time forces with Reserve or part-time forces is even older than the Middle ages. The Roman empire of the late fourth and early fifth centuries depended upon the *Comitatus*, a full-time, regular Army that was backed by the *limitanei* of part-time soldiers living on the land along the Empire's long frontiers and charged with defense in time of emergency (Currie et. al, 1, 1997).

America's Army Reserve started as a pool of people whose professional skills were not routinely needed during peacetime, but were absolutely critical upon mobilization or deployment. From its inception in 1908, the Army Reserve has grown and has been tested in every major war or conflict in which the nation has found itself since. From World War I through World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Panama, the Cold War, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, and now Bosnia, Army Reservists have answered the call to duty.

In 1990-1991, more than 84,000 Army Reserve soldiers contributed to the Army's success in Operation Desert Shield/Storm in the Persian Gulf ([www.Army Reserve Home Page](#)). Army reservists also contribute to national security through humanitarian and nation-building actions both overseas and at home. Actions have included aid to Somalia and Bangladesh, Kurdish relief efforts in Iraq and medical aid in Latin America. In 1995-1996, the Army Reserve helped to restore democracy in Haiti, providing more than 70 percent of all Reserve Component forces for Operation Uphold Democracy. In Bosnia, more than 70 percent of the Reserve soldiers mobilized since 1995 for Operation Joint Endeavor/Joint Guard in Bosnia have been Army Reservists ([www.Army Reserve Home Page](#)).

## **2. The Reserve Today**

On September 11<sup>th</sup>, 1997, Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, sent a policy memorandum to eliminate "all residual barriers — structural and cultural" to effective integration of the Reserve and Active components into a "seamless Total Force." Recognizing the increased reliance on the nation's reserve forces, Cohen defined "Integration" as the "conditions of readiness and trust needed for the leadership of all levels to have well-justified confidence that Reserve component units are trained and equipped to serve as an effective part of the joint and combined force within whatever timeliness are set for the unit — in peace and war (Cohen, 1997)."

As an increasingly integrated force in an Army in which the operational pace is as high as any time in peacetime history, the USAR has served in ways never before expected of the component of the Total Force. For example, more members of the Reserve have been mobilized for operations in Bosnia than were mobilized during the

entire Vietnam War, and the USAR has contributed more soldiers to Bosnia operations than any other reserve component (Plewes, 1997). In fiscal year 1998, the USAR soldiers deployed to 50 countries on six continents — logisticians off-loaded supplies in Guyana; veterinarians treated domestic animals across Africa, and soldier-sailors plied the waters off Alaska in support of an island road-building project (Plewes, 1997).


The new Army Reserve is a force of citizen-soldiers that brings relevant civilian skills to the Total Army and learns skills during Army service that are useful in civilian life. By staying relevant, the Army Reserve allows the active Army to focus more on warfighting skills and less on support missions. The Army becomes a stronger, more experienced team when Reserve soldiers train regularly with their active duty counterparts (Plewes, 1997).

The trained and resourced units are part of the warfighting or power-projection platform and support base. The Army Reserve provides 363 early-deploying combat support and combat service support units as part of the Army's priority force packages. These comprise the early-entry portions of another approximately 2,000 support units that the Army depends on for combat support and combat service support in operational theaters. During war or a major contingency, the continental U.S. replacement centers manage the flow of individuals into the theater. Deployment support brigades manage movement of mobilized units. Transportation terminal units command the ports necessary to deploy Army forces. Garrison support units bring installations to mobilization manning levels, and Transportation Platforms Command deploys mobilized units. The Army Reserve's investment in mobilization and deployment support structure

enables the active Army and Army National Guard to focus on maneuver units (Plewes, 1997).

### 3. Composition

The Reserve component is organized into three manpower/management categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. Figure 1 is a schematic of the composition of the Reserve. This thesis specifically focuses on the Ready Reserve. A brief overview, to include composition, policies, and procedures regarding the Ready Reserve, will be addressed for future discussion of participation and readiness issues (Kominiak, 1997, 9).



**Figure 1. Structure of the Reserve Component**

The Ready Reserve consists of the Select Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), as well as the Inactive National Guard (ING). Members of the Ready Reserve are subject to Presidential recall for war or for national emergencies, as prescribed in Title 10 of the United States Code (Kominiak, 1997, 10).

Select Reserve members are assigned to operational units, augmentation units, Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) positions, or Full Time Support (FTS) positions. Operational Units, or Troop Program Units (TPUs), train and maintain unit integrity, while augmentation units train as units during peacetime, but are integrated into active Army units during wartime. Members in FTS positions are drilling members who serve as cadre for select Reserve units (Kominiak, 1997, 10).

### **C. PERSONNEL READINESS REQUIREMENTS**

Personnel readiness can be simply defined as having the right number of soldiers with the correct skills (Kominiak, 1997, 10). The correct skills or training requirements of reservists play a major role in determining personnel readiness.

#### **1. Basic Training**

Initial entry training, a requirement for all reservists, is comprised of both basic training and advanced individual training. While basic training teaches all soldiers necessary combat skills, advanced individual training provides soldiers training in a specific military occupational specialty (MOS). Successful completion of these two phases of initial entry training results in the soldier being awarded a MOS, and being classified as MOS qualified. The significance of reservists who have not completed initial training and are not MOS qualified is that these reservists cannot be deployed.

## **2. Readiness**

Approximately 20-30 percent of positions in the Reserve are filled by members who are not MOS qualified (Kominiak, 1997, 10). This estimate, combined with the fact that most units have fewer personnel assigned than are authorized, results in readiness ratings which may prevent units from deploying, despite the need for the capabilities of the unit (Kominiak, 1997, 11).

The Army uses Army Regulation (AR) 220-1, Unit Status Reporting, as one measure of unit readiness. AR 220-1 outlines policies and procedures for units to determine readiness. Personnel readiness is one of the requirements a unit must meet before being qualified for deployment. Personnel readiness is determined through the calculation of available strength and available MOS trained strength. Available strength is defined as the percentage of required wartime personnel who are medically, physically, and legally deployable. Available MOS trained strength (DMOSQ – duty MOS qualified) is defined as the percentage of required wartime personnel who are both available to deploy and MOS qualified for their assigned duty position (Kominiak, 1997, 11).

## **3. Deployment Degradation**

Personnel readiness measures are used, along with other measures such as equipment-on-hand and training readiness, to determine a unit's overall readiness rating (C-rating). The unit's C-rating must meet or exceed the unit's Authorized Level of Organization (ALO), which designates the readiness level the unit must attain, before being qualified for deployment. Rectifying the nondeployable personnel status of the unit requires unqualified reservists to be trained (or retrained) until duty MOS qualified, or qualified reservists from other units to be transferred into the unit (Kominiak, 1997, 11).

The impact of degraded readiness levels of reserve units due to personnel fill shortages and MOS qualification shortfalls was highlighted during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. On average, approximately 20 percent of all activated unit's personnel shortfalls had to be corrected through crossleveling (Kominiak, 1997, 11). Whereas these shortfalls may not have been important in the past, the active component's increased reliance on the reserve made personnel readiness a critical issue. Although the reservists who were transferred into units with shortages fixed the shortfall problem, it created unit training (collective training) difficulties as these individuals had never trained with the unit they were scheduled to deploy with (Kominiak, 1997, 12).

Personnel readiness shortfalls are driven by high rates of personnel turnover. The causes of personnel turnover must first be identified, and then addressed to ensure the Reserve is ready to deploy when called as part of the Total Force (Kominiak, 1997, 12).

#### **D. TURNOVER**

Declining force levels and resources have combined with increasing peacetime deployments to create unprecedented operations tempos for active duty and reserve component units of all services. The effects of this fast pace and intense pressure greatly concern active duty military leaders. For instance, the Air Force recently made major operational requirement changes due to the dissatisfaction of many of its pilots (Barrios-Choplin, 1998).

##### **1. Deployment**

What is less known, but also of concern to military leaders, are the effects of deployment of reserve units and individuals, which is also increasing in the face of personnel drawdowns. Several major negative impacts are possible. First, individuals

who deploy once or more may decide to leave the reserve for many reasons. Many reservists suffer financial hardship when they are activated. Family separations also take a toll on relationships with spouses and dependents. Some reservists may perceive they lose ground in their civilian careers. Some reservists may feel being deployed on peacetime operations is counter to their contract and training (Barrios-Choplin, 1998).

## **2. Costs of Turnover**

For whatever reasons, enlisted soldiers are leaving the Army Reserve at increasing rates. For example, enlisted loss rates have increased from 31 percent in FY94 to nearly 38 percent in FY97. At an average cost of approximately \$60,000 to recruit and train non-prior service replacements and \$6,700 to recruit and train one prior service soldier, the Army Reserve is facing massive expenditures in FY99 to replace prior year losses (Barrios-Choplin, 1998). In either case, the costs resulting from turnover quickly consume a limited budget.

Obviously, these losses affect readiness and place a greater strain on remaining unit members, creating a downward spiral of increased cost and stress, and reduced personnel readiness and operational capability. An important question which may guide a solution is, How much of the increasing turnover is due to a deployment experience? One way to identify the real costs of deployment is to survey those reservists who have deployed and then subsequently left their units in an effort to single out true causes of turnover intention, dissatisfaction, and stress. Thus, the impact of deployment on Army Reserve personnel and units may be better understood (Barrios-Choplin, 1998).

The issue of force readiness is significant, as many vital support assets are located in the Reserve. Determining the causes of turnover and implementing programs and



procedures to reduce turnover should result in significant budget savings and an increase in total force readiness (Kominiak, 1997, 21).

### III. LITERATURE REVIEW

#### A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter begins with a broad discussion of motivation theory. Next, a review of specific turnover models that incorporate motivation research as a foundation for turnover predictions is presented. Finally, an integrated model is formulated to guide the study of the effects of deployments of Army Reserve units and individuals on enlisted turnover.

Turnover is one of the most enduring subjects of research in human resource management. Generally, turnover is concerned with determining those factors that influence employees to either stay in, or leave an organization. A workable definition describes turnover as the leaving behavior exhibited by employees when they sever their ties with the organization (Pearson, 1995). To better understand the issue of turnover among enlisted Army Reservists, it is useful to review relevant theoretical research to develop a framework from which to explore the problem.

*The 1996-1997 Survey of Troop Program Units (TPU)* conducted by the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR), finds that receiving money from the United States Army Reserve (USAR) is not a major motivator for joining or staying in the Reserve. Service to country is consistently the highest rated reason for continuing a relationship with the USAR. This finding coincides with work motivation studies, which suggest that one of the most profound motivations to work comes from the recognition of individual achievement and from the sense of personal growth in responsibility (Herzberg, Mausner, Snyderman, 1962). The Army demonstrates some understanding of personal work motivation theory in its recruiting slogan, "Be all you can be."

## **B. MOTIVATION THEORY**

Theories of motivation to work have passed through many stages, influencing and being influenced by the prevailing management ideologies and philosophies of each era (Bowey, 1986). Although there is a chronological sequence to the development of these theories, it does not mean that the old theories have become irrelevant. Unfortunately, most students of management and human resources receive only a cursory tutelage on motivation. Therefore, employers, managers, and employees, have a tendency to adhere to those theories that fit best within a framework of their own values and assumptions (Bowey, 1986). A better understanding of the primary theories of motivation as they relate to work, can aid policy makers in overcoming the detrimental effects of Army Reserve turnover.

### **1. Scientific Theory**

During the first part of this century, the leading theory of worker motivation management was the “classical” or scientific management approach. This theory portrayed working people as making rational economic calculations and following a consequent logical pattern of behavior at work (Taylor, 1947). Employers who accepted this theory believed that their workforce were driven by the desire to earn the most money possible. This led to elaborate payment plans, and practices such as using stopwatches to determine how long each element of each task should take. The idea was that if people were primarily motivated by money, and if they were offered the incentive of extra money for additional units of work, then they would work more efficiently and productivity would rise.

However, researchers began to notice that workers began to slow down at the end of the day, regardless of monetary incentives. Their first reaction was not to abandon belief in the motivating power of money. They instead began to look for intervening variables. The most likely cause was fatigue; workers were not strong enough or sufficiently nourished to keep up an accelerated work pace all day. This led to research studies by Elton Mayo and his team from Harvard University.

Mayo's initial work in the 1920s found that workers (in a Philadelphia textile mill) who were given extra breaks and subsidized meals at work, did improve their productivity. When these extra rewards were taken away, their effort fell back (Mayo, 1945). The research team then set up a major series of studies at the Hawthorne Works of the Western Electric Company. These experiments continued for ten years. Their aim was to study the effects of a range of fatigue-inducing factors such as levels of lighting, temperature, and frequency of breaks. A system of incentive payment by results was applied in conjunction with the physical elements (Roethlisberger and Dixon, 1939). Had this research produced the expected results, modern managers would have a clear prescription for motivating high productivity and low turnover. Managers could evoke positive employee responses simply by manipulating the lighting, temperature, and rest breaks. However, the outcomes of their experiments proved to be a surprise at the time. There was a steady improvement in productivity throughout all the changes, even when the lighting intensity was raised in imperceptible stages over a long period to a very bright intensity and then gradually reduced to that of a moonlit night (Mayo, 1945).

The researchers, in their attempts to ensure that no other variables intervened in their experiments, had unknowingly changed one of the most important variables of all: they

had increased the level of interest shown by the company in its employees, by regularly asking questions about their overall wellbeing. These questions were intended to assess any effects which personal issues might have on the experiment. Instead, the questioning completely changed the quality of the employees relationships to management and this had a positive effect on morale and productivity (Mayo, 1945).

## **2. Human Relations Theory**

The unintentional effect of managerial attention leading to increased productivity became known as the “Hawthorne Effect.” When the results of this research were published in the 1930s, they had an almost revolutionary effect on prevailing motivational theories. Managers spent less energy focusing on money as the motivator and turned their attention to the importance of “human relations” as a means of motivating and keeping employees (Bowey, 1986). Consequently, one over-simplistic view of human motivation was replaced by another equally simplistic theory. Thousands of managers were sent to training courses to learn the skills of “relating” to their employees — understanding employee problems and showing concern (Bowey, 1986).

Building upon the human relations findings, the new focus for motivation theory was on the search for satisfaction of human needs. This fresh approach swept through management circles in the 1950s. Job satisfaction is a person’s emotional response to aspects of work (such as pay, supervision and benefits) or the work itself. Satisfaction is determined by various factors of work e.g., work conditions, sense of belonging to the company, self-achievement, fulfillment of personality traits, and relationships with superiors, subordinates, and colleagues. How well employee needs and wants are met through work, usually indicates how well an organization maintains a stable workforce.

Consequences of dissatisfaction range from apathy, absenteeism, and high turnover, to disgruntlement and sabotage.


One of the first and most recognized of the human relations theorists was Abraham H. Maslow. Abraham Maslow is known for establishing the theory of a hierarchy of needs; writing that human beings are motivated by unsatisfied needs, and that certain lower needs must be satisfied before higher needs can be satisfied. Maslow studied people such as Albert Einstein, Jane Adams, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Frederick Douglas rather than mentally ill or neurotic people. This was a radical departure from two of the chief schools of psychology of his day: Freud and B.F. Skinner.

Freud saw little difference between the motivations of humans and animals. He thought that humans were supposedly rational beings; however, they did not act that way. Such pessimism, Maslow believed, was the result of Freud's study of mentally ill people. "The study of crippled, stunted, immature, and unhealthy specimens can yield only a cripple psychology and a cripple philosophy" (Maslow, 1970, p. 260). Skinner, on the other hand, studied how pigeons and white rats learn. His motivational models were based on simple rewards such as food and water, sex, and avoidance of pain. Maslow thought that psychologists should instead study the playfulness, affection, etc., of animals. He also believed that Skinner discounted things that make humans different from each other (Maslow, 1970).

Maslow's hierarchy of needs was an alternative to the depressing determinism of Freud and Skinner. He felt that people are basically trustworthy, self-protecting, and self-governing. According to Maslow, there are general types of needs (physiological, safety, love, and esteem) that must be satisfied before a person can act unselfishly. He called

these needs "deficiency needs." As long as we are motivated to satisfy these cravings, we are moving towards growth and self-actualization (Maslow, 1970, p. 38).

Needs are prepotent. A prepotent need is one that has the greatest influence over our actions. Everyone has a prepotent need, but that need will vary among individuals. A teenager may have a need to feel accepted by a group. An alcoholic will need to satisfy cravings for alcohol to function normally in society, and will not worry about acceptance by other people. According to Maslow, when the deficiency needs are met, other (and higher) needs emerge, and these, rather than physiological hungers, dominate the person. And when these in turn are satisfied, again new (and still higher) needs emerge, and so on. As one desire is satisfied, another pops up to take its place (Maslow, 1970). Maslow categorized these needs into five basic divisions to best illustrate his theory, aptly named *the Hierarchy of Needs*. Figure 2 depicts the hierachial nature of Maslow's theory.



**Figure 2. Model of Maslow's *Hierarchy of Needs* Theory**

The needs and their definitions are:

1. *Physiological Needs* - are the very basic needs such as air, water, food, sleep, sex, etc. When these are not satisfied people may feel sickness, irritation, pain, discomfort, etc. These feelings motivate people to alleviate them as soon as possible to establish homeostasis. Once they are alleviated, individuals may think about other things.
2. *Safety Needs* - have to do with establishing stability and consistency in a chaotic world. These needs are mostly psychological in nature. People need the security of a home and family. However, if a family is dysfunctional, i.e., an abusive husband, the wife cannot move to the next level because she is constantly concerned for her safety. Love and belongingness have to wait until she is no longer cringing in fear. Many in our society do not feel safe enough to go for a walk in their neighborhood. Many people, particularly those in the inner cities, are stuck at this level. In addition, safety needs sometimes motivate people to be religious. Religions comfort with the promise of a safe secure place after death.
3. *Love Needs* - and belongingness are next on the ladder. Humans have a desire to belong to groups: clubs, work groups, religious groups, family, gangs, etc. They need to feel loved (non-sexual) by others, to be accepted by others. Performers appreciate applause. People need to be needed. Beer commercials are a good example of advertising agencies catering to this need. In addition to playing on sex, they more often than not, show how beer makes for camaraderie.
4. *Esteem Needs* - There are two types of esteem needs. First is self-esteem which results from competence or mastery of a task. Second, there is the attention and recognition that comes from others. This is similar to the belongingness level, however, wanting admiration has to do with the need for power. People who have all of their lower needs satisfied, often drive very expensive cars because doing so raises their level of esteem.
5. *Self-Actualization* - The need for self-actualization is "the desire to become more and more what one is, to become everything that one is capable of becoming." People who have everything can maximize their potential. They can seek knowledge, peace, esthetic experiences, self-fulfillment, oneness with God, etc. For example, it is usually middle-class to upper-class students who take up environmental causes, join the Peace Corps, go off to a monastery, and so on (<http://www.nidus.org/>).

A second popular theory of motivation, closely related to Maslow's need hierarchy, was proposed by Frederick Herzberg (Szilagyi and Wallace, 1990). The theory, which has been called the *two-factor* or motivation-hygiene theory, has been widely received by managers concerned with keeping a productive, long-term relationship with their employees.



The original research used in developing the theory was conducted with 200 accountants and engineers using the critical-incident method for data collection (Szilagyi and Wallace, 1990). Herzberg used interview responses to questions such as "Can you describe, in detail, when you feel particularly good about your job?" "Can you describe, in detail, when you feel particularly bad about your job?" The results obtained from this research methodology were fairly consistent across the various subjects. Good feelings about the job were reflected in comments concerning the *content* and experiences of the job (e.g. doing good work or a feeling of accomplishment and challenge); bad feelings about the job were associated with *context* factors, that is, those surrounding but not directly involved in the work itself (e.g., salary and working conditions). This procedure revealed two distinct types of motivational factors: *satisfiers* and *dissatisfiers*.


The Herzberg research resulted in two conclusions (Szilagyi and Wallace, 1990, p. 102):

1. There is a set of extrinsic job conditions that, when not present, result in dissatisfaction among employees. If these conditions are present, their presence does not necessarily motivate employees. These conditions are the dissatisfiers, or hygiene factors, because they are needed to maintain at least a level of no dissatisfaction. These factors related to the context of the job and called dissatisfiers, include the following:
  - a. Job security
  - b. Salary
  - c. Working conditions
  - d. Status
  - e. Company policies
  - f. Quality of technical supervision
  - g. Quality of interpersonal relations among peers, supervisors, and subordinates
  - h. Fringe benefits
2. A set of intrinsic job conditions exist that help build levels of motivation, which can result in good job performance. If these conditions are not present, they do not result in dissatisfaction. These aspects, related to job content and called satisfiers, include the following:
  - a. Achievement
  - b. Recognition
  - d. Responsibility
  - e. Advancement

c. Work itself

f. Personal growth and development

As shown in Figure 3, Herzberg reduced Maslow's five need levels into two distinct levels of analysis. The hygiene factors, or dissatisfiers, are analogous to Maslow's lower-level needs (i.e. physiological, safety, and social). The absence of hygiene factors from the workplace leads to high levels of dissatisfaction their presence creates a state of "zero dissatisfaction" or neutrality. By themselves, hygiene factors (or job-context factors) so not motivate individuals to better performance . (Szilagyi and Wallace, 1990).



**Figure 3. Herzberg's Motivation-Hygiene Theory**

The motivators, or satisfiers, are equivalent to Maslow's higher-level needs. These are the job-content factors that motivate people to perform. According to Herzberg, only such factors as a challenging job, recognition for doing good work, and opportunities for advancement, personal growth, and development foster motivated behavior.


As an example, consider assembly-line workers in manufacturing firms. For years, such firms have experienced worker motivational problems that often result in high turnover. In response, many firms have reacted by instituting costly fringe-benefit plans, significant wage increases, and elaborate security and seniority programs. Even with such massive programs, motivational problems remain.

In Herzberg's framework, these managerial reactions have focused primarily on the hygiene factors surrounding the job, which has resulted in bringing individuals to the theoretical "zero point" of motivation. The two-factor theory would predict that improvements in motivation would only appear when leadership action focused not only on the factors surrounding the job but on the job itself. This can be done by partially removing the boredom and routineness inherent in most assembly-line jobs and developing jobs that can provide increased levels of challenge and opportunities for a sense of achievement, advancement, growth and personal development (Szilagyi and Wallace, 1990).

Fundamentally, expectancy theory relates to choice. Specifically, the theory states that individuals will evaluate various strategies of behavior (e.g., working hard each day versus working hard three days out of five) and then choose the course of action that they believe will lead to those work-related rewards that they value (e.g., pay increase). If the

individual worker believes that working hard each day will lead to pay increase, expectancy theory would predict that this will be the chosen behavior (Vroom, 1964).

Building on the early works of psychologists E. C. Tolman, Kurt Lewin, and Joan W. Atkinson, Victor Vroom presented a process theory of motivation that he calls an instrumentality or *expectancy theory*. As shown in Figure 4, the foundation of expectancy theory is the perceived relationship between effort, performance, and the reward received for performance.



**Figure 4. A Basic Expectancy Theory Model**

The key variables in Vroom's formulation are:

An **outcome** is the end result of a particular behavior, and can be classified as a first- or second-level outcome. First-level outcomes relate to the result of putting in some effort on the job—in other words, some level of performance. Second-level outcomes are consequences to which first-level outcomes are expected to lead. That is, the end result of performance (first-level) is some form of reward (second-level).

**Expectancy** is a belief in the likelihood that a particular level of effort will be followed by a corresponding performance level. In practical terms, the issue is whether the person can actually do the assigned work. Based on probabilities an expectancy can vary from 1.0 ("I should have no problem getting the assignment done on time, or in reaching high performance levels") to 0 (Even if I work extremely hard, there's no way I can get the work done on time").

**Instrumentality** refers to the relationship between first- and second-level outcomes—how performance levels and the rewards for this performance are related. Like a statistical correlation, instrumentalities can vary from +1.0 to -1.0. If the first-level outcome always leads to a second-level outcome (“Continued high performance I always rewarded with a good pay raise”), the instrumentality would equal +1.0. If there is no relationship between performance and rewards (“This organization never rewards good performance”), then instrumentality approaches zero.

**Valence** is the strength of a person’s preference for a particular outcome. Stated differently, it concerns the value a person places on such rewards as pay increases, promotions, recognition, and so on. Valences can also have positive and negative values. In a work situation, we would expect pay increases to have a positive valence, while such outcomes as a supervisory reprimand may have a negative valence—in other words, they are not highly valued.

**Force to perform** is the result of the preceding perceptual process and involves how hard a person decides to work and what behaviors he or she plans to exhibit (i.e., choice). Finally, wanting to perform well and actually doing so are moderated by the person’s ability—his or her capacity for performing a task. In applied terms, it means what a person can do, rather than what he or she will or want to do (Szilagyi and Wallace, 1990, 126).

Since Vroom’s initial model, expectancy theory has undergone at least four modifications (Campbell, 1970). First, the theory was extended by making a distinction between extrinsic outcomes (e.g., pay and promotion) and intrinsic outcomes (e.g., recognition, achievement, and personal development). Extrinsic valences are outcomes that come to the individual from others because of his or her performance; intrinsic valences are associated with the job itself.

A further distinction was made between two types of expectancies. Expectancy I is concerned with the perceived relationship between effort expended and first-order outcomes, such as performance or work-goal accomplishment. Expectancy II, similar to Vroom’s concept of instrumentality, is concerned with the relationship between first-level outcomes (e.g., performance) and second-level outcomes or rewards (e.g., pay,

recognition, or achievement). These expectancies have come to be known as *effort-to-performance* and *performance-to-reward* respectively.

The third development concerns the broadening of the theory to include the possible effects of other work-related variables on the major variables of the theory (House, 1974). These revisions include the possible impact of personality variables (e.g., self-esteem and self-confidence) on the formation of expectancy perceptions, the effect of past experiences on expectancy development, and the inclusion of role perceptions and environmental conditions as possible factors affecting the relationships with motivation and actual performance (Peters, 1977).

Finally, the theory was extended to include the variable of work-related satisfaction. According to the new model, satisfaction is a function of actual performance and the real rewards gained from that performance. Since the introduction of Vroom's model, the number of efforts to substantiate the expectancy theory has grown. Various published reviews of expectancy theory research have revealed three points: (1) the dimensions of effort-to-performance and performance-to-reward expectancies have generally been shown to be positively related to the individual outcomes of performance and satisfaction; (2) personality variables appear to have an effect on an individual's expectancy and valence perceptions; and (3) the predictive power of the expectancy model with respect to performance and satisfaction is not significantly improved when expectancies and valences are combined (multiplicatively or additively), as compared to the two variable relationships noted earlier (Szilagyi and Wallace, 1990).

Expectancies, instrumentalities, and valences are concepts most people can relate to in doing their work. Motivation is undoubtedly affected by responses to such questions as

“Can I do the work?” “What will I get for performing well?” and “Are the rewards for good performance (or poor performance) of value to me?” Whether these concepts act independently to predict motivation or in combination is a subject for continued research.


### **C. TURNOVER THEORY**

There have been numerous investigations into the causes of employee turnover. Beginning with the early studies of Bernays (1910) and Crabb (1912) and continuing to the present, over 1000 studies on the subject have been carried out. The first formal reviews of the field appeared in the mid-1950s with the work of Brayfield and Crockett (1955) and Herzberg (1957). Both reviews found evidence of a significant relationship between employee dissatisfaction and subsequent turnover. However, it was noted that many of the studies to that date exhibited serious methodological problems (e.g., a failure to obtain independent measures, the use of poorly validated or ambiguous research instruments). Hence, although not rejecting the hypothesis that dissatisfaction causes turnover, these reviewers argued that much more rigorous measurement techniques were in order if there was to be advancement in the understanding of this topic (Mowday et. al, 1982). Today, two such pioneers of turnover research, William H. Mobley and Richard T. Mowday, are the most recognized authorities of turnover theory.

#### **1. The Expanded Mobley et al. Model**

Historically, a fundamental problem in the turnover literature has been a preoccupation with single relationships and insufficient focus on the conceptual basis of turnover as a psychological process (Mobley, 1982). From both the managerial and research perspectives, it is necessary to have adequate conceptual models of the turnover process to: (1) interpret research findings; (2) suggest new avenues of research; (3) call

attention to the multiple determinants of turnover; (4) and to guide managers in diagnosing and dealing with turnover. Mobley's model, depicted in Figure 5, incorporates elements of preceding models and attempts to capture the overall complexity of the turnover process.



**Figure 5. An expanded model of the employee turnover process**

From the model, it can be conceptualized that job satisfaction is a present-oriented evaluation of the job, involving a comparison of an employee's multiple values and what the employee perceives the job as providing. Mobley (1982) found that for some



individuals, a repetitive job, rotating shifts, no overtime, and congenial coworkers may be valued aspects of a job. For others, involvement in decision making, flexible work hours, and high-incentive earnings may be the most salient work values. Uniform policies, practices, and procedures, which treat the work force as homogenous, are likely to be increasingly ineffective because they do not recognize and are not responsive to individual differences in values. Employee selection, assimilation, placement, and reward systems need to be sensitive to individual differences in work values.

Although an employee may currently be dissatisfied, turnover may not occur. The individual may expect that the present job will change or lead to more satisfying roles in the future. Such future-oriented expectations and evaluations can be based on: expected changes in the present job; expected transfer possibilities; expected promotions; expected changes in organizational policies, practices or conditions (such as changes in pay, job content, or management, etc.); and/or expected transfer, promotion, or turnover among other individuals (Mobley, 1982). The basic training military recruit is an example of an individual who may be dissatisfied with his present job but who does not quit because of positive expectations about future roles in the organization.

It is important to recognize that just as the dissatisfied employee may not quit, given positive expectations about future roles in the organization the currently satisfied employee who has negative expectations about the future in the organization, may quit. While satisfaction is based on multiple individual values and current perceptions, expected utility of alternative internal roles is based on multiple individual values and future expectations of policies, practices, conditions and outcomes in the organization. Therefore, in diagnosing turnover, it is necessary to assess not only the employee's

current satisfaction but also the employee's expectations about future roles in the organization based on the work values most important to the individual.


## **2. Mowday's Employee-Organization Linkages (Commitment) Model**

Richard Mowday (1982) states that the identification of causal relationships in the study of commitment represents an important area of theoretical concern in turnover research. Unlike job satisfaction, which is viewed as less stable attitude that may reflect contemporaneous job conditions, commitment is viewed as a more stable attachment to the organization that develops slowly over time.

The commitment of employees to organizations is perhaps best characterized as a process that unfolds over time. This process may begin before the employee enters the organization and may extend over successive years of employment. To develop a better understanding of employee commitment it is necessary to focus attention on the factors that may influence the development of commitment at different stages of an employee's career, and on the process through which employees become committed to organizations. Figure 6 shows a model of commitment antecedents and outcomes of organizational commitment according to Mowday's research.

Numerous studies have examined the effects of various personal characteristics on organizational commitment. Personal characteristics studied have included age, tenure, educational level, gender, race, and various personality factors. Briefly, they have shown correlation in the following manner. Both age and tenure have been shown to be positively related to commitment. March and Simon (1958) noted that as age or tenure in the organization increases, the individual's opportunities for alternative employment become more limited. This decrease in an individual's degrees of freedom may increase

the perceived attractiveness of the present employer, thereby leading to increase psychological attachment (Mowday, 1982, p. 30).



**Figure 6. A Model of Commitment Antecedents and Outcomes**

In contrast to age and tenure, education has often been found to be inversely related to commitment. This inverse relationship may result from the fact that more highly educated individuals have higher expectations that the organization may be unable to meet. Moreover, more educated individuals may also be more committed to a profession or trade, making it more difficult for the organization to compete for the psychological involvement of such members (Mowday, 1982).

Other research has found that gender is consistently related to commitment. Women, as a group, are found to be more committed than men. It is believed that women generally have to overcome more barriers to attain their positions in the organization, thereby making organizational membership more important to them (Mowday, 1982).

Finally, Mowday's studies have examined various personality factors as they relate to commitment. Commitment has been found to be related to achievement motivation, sense of competence, and other high-order needs (Mowday, 1982).

The second group of correlates in Mowday's model relate to employee roles and job characteristics. Mowday (1982) identified three related aspects of work roles that have the potential to influence commitment: job scope or challenge, role conflict, and role ambiguity. Increased job scope increases the challenge employees experience and thereby increases commitment. Role conflict was found to be inversely related to commitment. Mixed hypothesis emerged for role ambiguity. When assignments are ambiguous and role conflict and role stress are prevalent, then the effects on commitment tend to be adverse.

When looking at structural correlates of commitment, it was found that formalization, functional dependence, and decentralization were positively related to commitment. Employees experiencing greater decentralization, greater dependence on the work of others, and greater formality of written rules and procedures felt more committed to the organization than employees experiencing these factors to a lesser extent (Mowday, 1982).

Several work experience variables have been found to be related to organizational commitment. In three studies, organizational dependability, or the extent to which employees felt the organization could be counted upon to look after employee interests, was significantly related to positive commitment. Mowday also found feelings of personal importance to the organization to be positively related to commitment. That is, when employees felt they were needed or important to the organization's mission,


commitment attitudes increased. Commitment was also found to be related to the extent to which employee expectations were met in the work place (Mowday, 1982).

In all, at least 25 variables have been found to be related in some way with organizational commitment in Mowday's research. These variables trace their origins to various aspects of organization life, including personal characteristics of the individual members, role-related characteristics of the work place, structural aspects of the organization, and the various work experiences encountered by the employees.

#### **D. INTEGRATED TURNOVER MODEL**

Motivation and turnover theories provide the general framework for the introduction of an integrated turnover model shown in Figure 7. The model relates a Reservist's deployment experience to the presence or absence of six major factors: involvement, demotivators, equity, reinforcement, reward relevance, and goals.

When one or more of these factors is predominantly absent from a reservist's deployment experience (present regarding demotivators), s/he may be more inclined to leave the unit. If, however, the reservist perceives the presence of the factors, s/he may be more likely to report a positive deployment experience and remain with the reserve unit. The six factors are explained, and their origins identified, in the following text.



### 1. Involvement

Involvement refers to developing reservist commitment to success and a sense of ownership. Leadership can begin developing soldiers from the point of entry by soliciting soldiers participation in career development plans. Later, as soldiers gain rank and knowledge, this type of two-way communication will become critical to maintaining soldier commitment.

The origins of this model element can be found in Mayo's Hawthorne studies, where it was discovered that speaking with and not at an employee can garner improved performance and commitment. Herzberg's *satisfiers* are described as a set of intrinsic job conditions that help build levels of motivation, which can result in good job performance.

Responsibility and personal growth and development are among this set of intrinsic job conditions that pertain to the involvement factor. Lastly, Mowday includes involvement in the organizational segment of his turnover model.

## **2. Demotivators**

Demotivators are the impediments which frustrate reservists from achieving high levels of performance. It is difficult to motivate high performance if soldiers are frustrated by not having the right quality and amounts of equipment, tools, space, materials, spare parts, instructions, support systems, co-operation from others, or other needed resources.

Often, not having the right tools and materials for a job makes for an unsafe and often life threatening working environment. When personnel depend on adequate equipment and supplies for their very existence e.g., sturdy tents, reliable space heaters, and a clean water supply, as deployed reservists often do, Maslow's hierarchy of needs may be cited as the central origin of this model element. The two most applicable levels in Maslow's hierarchy model are *physiological* and *safety* needs.

As defined earlier, physiological needs are the very basic needs such as air, water, food, and sleep. When these are not satisfied, serious life-threatening conditions override concerns about job performance. These deficiencies force people to focus all their efforts on alleviating them. Once they are alleviated, individuals may think about other things. The next need level on Maslow's model, safety, is defined as having to do with establishing stability and consistency in a chaotic world. These needs are mostly psychological in nature. People need the security of a home and family, or some type of family unit such as a reserve unit when on arduous deployment.

### **3. Equity**

Equity refers to performance standards that are applied to goals, targets, or behavior changes for pay or promotions. Performance standards should be fair and comparable for all employees doing the same job in any organization. When inequities are perceived by individuals who belong to an organization founded on equitable principles, such as the Army, trust of the organization is likely to be shattered. When trust is eliminated, commitment will also diminish.

The Integrated Turnover Model's equity factor originated from the *motivators* in Herzberg's Motivation-Hygiene theory. The motivators, or satisfiers, are equivalent to Maslow's higher-level needs. These are the job-content factors that motivate people to perform. According to Herzberg, only such factors as a challenging job, recognition for doing good work, opportunities for advancement, personal growth, and development foster highly motivated behavior. If a soldier does not feel he has an equal opportunity to compete within the organization, then s/he may seek employment elsewhere resulting in loss of qualified personnel.

Equity also has roots in Vroom's expectancy theory. The foundation of expectancy theory is the perceived relationship between effort, performance, and the reward received for performance. Lastly, equity is highlighted in Mowday's turnover model by underscoring the commitment factors.

### **4. Reinforcement**

By definition of the Integrated Turnover Model, reinforcement stresses the value of providing encouragement, guidance, and feedback to all personnel. In short, positive reinforcement for valued efforts must be formalized. The idea is simple: systematically



reinforce desired behaviors by linking performance to rewards, i.e., promotion, special training, and desirable positions.

Reinforcement is borrowed from Vroom's expectancy theory. Since the introduction of Vroom's model, efforts to investigate expectancy theory have grown substantially. The various published reviews of expectancy theory research have revealed three points: (1) the dimensions of effort-to-performance and performance-to-reward expectancies have generally been shown to be positively related to the individual outcomes of performance and satisfaction; (2) personality variables appear to have an effect on an individual's expectancy and valence perceptions; and (3) the predictive power of the expectancy model with respect to performance and satisfaction is not significantly improved when expectancies and valences are combined (multiplicatively or additively), as compared to the two variable relationships noted earlier (Szilagyi and Wallace, 1990).

Expectancies, instrumentalities, and valences are concepts most people can relate to in doing their work. Motivation is undoubtedly affected by responses to such questions as "Can I do the work?" "What will I get for performing well?" and "Are the rewards for good performance (or poor performance) of value to me?"

### **5. Relevance of Reward**

Though soldiers are individuals with different needs, desires, likes and dislikes, they also share many values. These shared values can be identified and brought into focus when developing reward systems for the troops. Relevance of reward in the Integrated Turnover Model is an element that stresses linking performance to rewards.

Relevance of reward is grounded in Vroom's expectancy theory. However, scientific theory also supports this element by suggesting that management interest in employees

induces higher productivity. If leadership provides rewards to satisfy the array of human needs, then Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory provides the rationale. An overall understanding of the many facets of a reward system can be garnered from reviewing Mobley's expanded model of the employee turnover process.

## **6. Goals**

The goals component of the Integrated Turnover Model expresses the idea that leadership can consult with subordinates about the goals, targets, or behavior changes which will earn the desired rewards. It is suggested that when leadership and subordinates share consensus and clarity about goals, targets, or behavior changes, awards hold more value and the task or mission may be more readily accomplished. This portion of the Integrated Turnover Model is derived from Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theory. According to Herzberg, only such factors as a challenging job, recognition for doing a good job, and opportunities for advancement, personal growth, and development foster motivated behavior.

The need for goal consensus and clarity is best defined by Mowday's model of commitment antecedents and outcomes. There are at least three related aspects of work role that have the potential to influence commitment: job scope or challenge, role conflict, and role ambiguity. Increased job scope increases the challenge employees experience and thereby increases commitment. Role conflict was found to be inversely related to commitment. Mixed hypothesis emerged for role ambiguity. (Mowday, 1982).

The Integrated Turnover Model simplifies a complex array of variables into six major factors affecting an individual's decision to stay or leave the reserves after a deployment experience. The model, as well as the theories studied to develop the model, guides the

research of the problem of turnover of enlisted reservists who have deployed and then left their units after completion of one deployment. The methodology for linking the perceptions of prior Army reservists into a model that can be used to reduce turnover is detailed in the next chapter.

## **IV. METHODOLOGY**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter details the design of the study, which is based on the Integrated Turnover Model developed from relevant motivational and turnover management theories introduced in the previous chapter. The model is designed to link the post-deployment perceptions of enlisted Army Reserve personnel into six major factors to increase understanding of reserve turnover, and to suggest ways to reduce turnover. The model is used to study the circumstances and reasons which result in enlisted reservist turnover. Understanding why reservists leave their units may enable Army leadership to identify policies and procedures which may reduce currently unacceptable high turnover rates. The next section of this chapter details the design of the study and notes how the data were analyzed.

### **B. DESIGN OF THE STUDY**

#### **1. Interview Questions**

Previous research on the subject of turnover was often based on archival and survey methods. One weakness of this practice is that it measures turnover intention versus real turnover. This study used semi-structured telephone interviews with enlisted reservists who left their units after deployment to determine how the deployment experience contributes to decisions to leave. In addition to demographic questions, the interviews contained a number of open-ended questions to allow the respondents to describe their own positive and negative experiences surrounding the topic of deployment. Kominiak

(1997) states that “grass-roots” interviews of organizational dropouts may help guide policy.

Interview questions were developed based primarily on the integrated turnover model. This model contains elements of leadership style, reservist attitudes toward the Army Reserve, personal effects of the deployment experience, reward effectiveness, and equality issues. The model provides a framework to examine the turnover process as it applies to the context of the Army Reserve, and guides the study of the reasons a reservist leaves the unit. Initial questions addressed demographic information about the respondents as well as the circumstances of their deployment such as, where they deployed and for how long. The next set of questions addressed how the deployment was perceived to effect reservists’ personal lives, for example: “What was the best thing about deployment?” and “What was the effect of deployment on your family, finances, civilian job?”. These questions provided data about the disruptions that deployments place on soldiers. The results can be seen in Appendix C.

The third section of the questionnaire contained two questions designed to address the reservists’ understanding of the reserve contract: “Do you feel that being deployed in a ‘peacetime’ operation was part of your reserve obligation?” and “Did you have to give back any money (e.g., college tuition, retention bonus, etc) when you left your unit?” The purpose of these questions was to address the circumstances in which a deployment may occur, and to assess the financial penalties of breaking a contract obligation.

The last section of the questionnaire corresponded to the six integrated turnover elements in the model: involvement, demotivators, equity, reinforcement, relevance of reward, and goals. Questions were designed to elicit the reservist’s personal experience

and opinion on these key issues affecting turnover. Questions from this section explored factors pertaining to peer equity, quality of leadership, and mission support. For example: "Were performance expectations the same for you and those doing the same work?", "Do you feel you received adequate performance feedback from leadership?" and "Did you support the reasons for your deployment?". Data collected from these questions indicated the reservist's overall attitude toward the Army Reserve and revealed valuable insight on why these reservists' left their units after deployment. Their responses may assist policy makers in ways to minimize post-deployment turnover of otherwise valuable reserve personnel.

## **2. Sampling Procedure**

The sampling frame was a subset of the population of reservists who left their units after a recent deployment experience, chosen from a list provided by the United States Army Reserve Command. The list contained the names of 870 reservists from the Inactive Ready Reserve database collected during fiscal year 1997. The random number three was selected from numbers ranging from one to ten. The third person, and every third person on the list thereafter, was called. The sample size was 870, and the total number of usable interviews was 52. Of those that were contacted, only three reservists declined to participate.

## **3. Data Collection**

If a call resulted in a number which was no longer in service, or did not belong to the name on the list, the name was omitted. An average of nine calls were necessary to generate one interview. Therefore, approximately 450 calls were made to obtain the 52

interviews. Once contact was made, the interview was conducted using the interview protocol, with each lasting an average of 28 minutes.

After obtaining 52 interviews, a coding system was developed for each question. To test the reliability of the coding system, two independent raters each coded a subsample, and achieved 94 percent inter-coder reliability. Using the coding system, the researcher coded each question on the interview protocol. The code sheet and the code book are in Appendices B and C, respectively.

The data were coded and entered into Excel. Frequency and cross tabulation statistics and graphics commands were used to calculate and display the data. Results of the data analysis are presented in the next chapter.

## **V. RESULTS**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**


Chapter IV detailed the methodology used to answer the research questions based on telephone interviews with 52 respondents. This chapter presents the results of the data analysis. The Integrated Turnover Model provides the framework for organizing and discussing the results. The subsections of the chapter include the six segments of the model: involvement, demotivators, equity, reinforcement, reward relevance, and goals. Next, the subsidiary research questions are addressed, with results related to the corresponding stage of the integrated model where appropriate. Suggestions by the reservists on how to make reserve soldiers' deployment experiences better are presented at the end of this chapter. The interview protocol, codesheet, and all resulting frequency representations can be viewed in appendices A, B, and C respectively.

### **B. INVOLVEMENT**

Involvement refers to developing reservists' commitment to success and a sense of ownership. Leaders can begin developing the soldier from initial assignment by soliciting the soldier's participation in career development plans. Later, as soldiers gain rank and knowledge, this type of two-way communication will become critical to maintaining soldier commitment. The research questions in this stage explore the different levels of involvement reported by the soldiers.


As illustrated in Figure 8, 63 percent of the respondents reported that they supported the reasons for their deployment, indicating that they understood the need for their involvement in the mission. Of the 21 percent whose answers were mixed, the consensus was that they trusted the judgement of leadership and would go anywhere, whenever they were asked.





**Figure 8. Did you support the reasons for your deployment?**

Figure 9 portrays 83 percent reporting they felt committed to the mission. Among those who responded with a mixed answer, the reasoning was best explained by one reservist who said, "At first I didn't think we should be there (Bosnia) and then I saw how much they needed us, then I felt true commitment." This sentiment was often repeated.




**Figure 9. Did you feel committed to the mission?**

### C. DEMOTIVATORS

Demotivators are factors that frustrate reservists and likely degrade optimum performance. It is extremely challenging to motivate high performance if soldiers' efforts to perform well are frustrated by not having the right quality and amounts of equipment, tools, space, materials, spare parts, instructions, support systems, co-operation from others, or other needed resources. Likewise, worries about finances, family, school, and civilian employment can greatly distract and demotivate a soldier.

As depicted in Figure 10, equal numbers, 44 percent each, believed that leadership did (or did not) do their best to remove difficulties that may have made soldiers' jobs more difficult. Of those who reported that leadership did a satisfactory job of removing difficulties it is important to relate that they still reported frustrations, i.e., leaders tried to remove certain obstacles, and often failed. Thus, frustration ran high among most respondents.

The reservists who reported negatively were very disappointed with leadership efforts in this area. One veteran of a previous deployment and a reservist for 19 years said, "My CO's main concern was when could she catch the next shuttle to Austria so she could fatten her crystal collection. We never saw her!" Others voiced similar experiences, citing leaders who spent all their time in the bar or in the gym.



**Figure 10. Do you think leadership did their best to remove any difficulties that may have made your job more difficult?**

A cross tabulation in Figure 11 shows that for those who reported that leaders did not do their best to remove any difficulties, respondents were most distressed about family separation, poor leadership, and money problems. This indicates that, aside from family separation and money problems, other disatisfiers are within the sphere of Army control.

Worst	fam sep	poor leadership	\$ probs	conditions	not trained	boredom	N/A	other	Total
Remove Difficulty									
NO	11	4	3	0	1	1	0	2	22

**Figure 11. Cross tabulation of 'worst thing about deployment' and respondents who reported that leadership did not do their best to remove difficulties**

#### **D. EQUITY**

Equity is performance standards which are applied to goals, targets, or behavior changes for pay or promotions. Performance standards should be fair and comparable for all employees doing the same job in any organization. When inequities are perceived by individuals who belong to an institution that bases its foundations on equity, trust is weakened and commitment is diminished.

Of the 52 respondents, 35 percent and 37 percent of the reservists felt they were not evaluated equally with other reservists or active duty respectively. Seventy-one percent said they perceived performance expectations to be the same for all soldiers doing similar work. Nine reservists felt they were treated as "second class" soldiers, even receiving inferior supplies compared with active duty soldiers. One reservist said, "We were treated like red-headed stepchildren by the regulars."

#### **E. REINFORCEMENT**

By definition of the Integrated Turnover Model, reinforcement stresses the need to provide subordinates encouragement, guidance, and feedback. This is an 'old' idea that is persistently powerful. Reinforcement links to awareness. Soldiers are more aware of their leaders' interest in their performance, and soldiers seek to earn desired rewards, such as promotion, special training, and preferred positions. The results of the two subsidiary research questions used to determine the level of reinforcement are displayed in Figures 12 and 13.




Figure 12. Question 28-Did you receive adequate job support from leadership?




Figure 13. Question 29-Did you receive adequate performance feedback from leadership?

Invariably, all negative and mixed results, although less than positive responses, expressed confusion with the chain-of-command. Many reservists were moved from job to job and therefore, leader to leader. They said they did not have the opportunity to spend sufficient time with one chain-of-command or have time to adequately display their skills.

## F. RELEVANCE OF REWARD

Though soldiers are individuals with different needs, desires, likes and dislikes, they also share many values. These shared values can be identified and brought into focus when developing reward systems for the troops. Relevance of reward in the Integrated Turnover Model refers to soldiers' perceptions of meaningfulness of potential rewards. Reservists were queried about the intrinsic value and desirability of certain types of awards. Results are shown in Figures 14 and 15.

Most stressed that if the current system were used as initially intended, they would be satisfied with, and motivated by the Army's award program. It is noteworthy that many reservists expressed that verbal recognition for doing good work is highly valued. The overriding complaint about the current reward system is that it has lost all meaning because awards are given to everyone, regardless of individual merit. This was referred to as "blanket awarding" by the respondents.




Figure 14. Question-32. Do these awards inspire top performance?




Figure 15. Question-33. What kind of awards would be desirable?

## G. GOALS

The goals component of the Integrated Turnover Model expresses the idea that leaders should consult with subordinates about the goals, targets, or behavior changes which will improve performance. Ideally, leaders and subordinates can obtain consensus and clarity about the goals, targets, or behavior changes necessary to earn rewards and accomplish the task or mission.

The goal of the assigned task or job was understood by 85 percent of the respondents. The way to accomplish defined goals was clear to 81 percent of the reservists. As evidenced by this study, awards were not used to enhance reservists performance, only 15 percent reported that leadership suggested that awards would be given to those who did a good job.

The answers to the subsidiary questions used in this segment of the model indicate that reservists had a good understanding of what was expected of them and the goal of their tasks. They also made it clear that awards were not promised for a job well done, indicating that motivation for doing good work is not solely derived by tangible awards and that other motivation techniques may be very effective.

## **H. SUBSIDIARY QUESTIONS**

The subsidiary questions serve as a set of supplemental queries designed to give a better understanding of the specific demographics of the respondent pool. Where appropriate, the questions will be related to relevant segments of the Integrated Turnover Model.

### **1. Personal Demographics**

Married soldiers represented 58 percent of those surveyed. Since this is not an overwhelming majority, the data is less likely to be over-represented by this segment of the reserve populace. Sixty percent of the reservists in this study had children at the time of their deployment. All of the respondents are high school graduates or equivalent, 42 percent report having some college education, and 21 percent have four-year degrees. This group represents a wide array of civilian occupations which are represented in Figure 16.






Figure 16. Question-7. What is your civilian occupation?

## 2. Professional Demographics

The demographics of the 52 respondents show that 88 percent have obtained the rank of E4 or E5. Only two of the reservists had less than one year in the reserves. Approximately 31 percent had between two and four years of reserve time, 40 percent had at least four but less than eight years in the reserve, and 25 percent had eight or more years reserve experience. Fifty-eight percent of the soldiers have prior active duty military experience. These numbers indicate that these were not inexperienced soldiers.

The respondents experienced one of three geographic deployment possibilities, Germany, Bosnia, or the United States (U.S.). Reservists were almost equally divided between Germany and Bosnia, with 46 percent deployed to the former and 43 percent

deployed to the latter. Five reservists remained in the U.S. to assist in predeployment activities. Eighty-five percent of the soldiers were deployed longer than 6 months. To get a sense of any outstanding differences in deployment experiences as a factor of location, two cross-tabulations were computed. Figure 17 compares reservists responses to the question, "What was the best thing about your deployment?" by deployment location and Figure 18 compares reservists responses to the question, "What was the worst thing about your deployment?" by deployment location. These tables show that location of deployment may not be a factor in determining turnover behavior. To view the second and third choice responses to 'best thing' and 'worst thing' about deployment, refer to Appendix C. The first choice responses for 'best thing' and 'worst thing' are discussed later in this chapter.

Location	Bosnia	Germ	USA
<b>Best Thing</b>			
Travel	7	15	0
Money	4	2	0
Work in MOS	2	3	1
Learn Culture	3	0	0
Comradery	5	2	1
Help Others	0	0	0
Stay in USA	0	0	2
Other	1	2	1

**Figure 17. Cross-tabulation of 'where deployed' and 'best thing'**

Location	Bosnia	Germ	USA
<b>Worst Thing</b>			
Family Sep.	9	12	1
Poor Leaders	4	4	2
\$ Problems	0	3	2
Living Conditions	3	0	0
Working Conditions	4	3	1
Not Trained	0	0	0
Boredom	1	1	0
Other	2	2	0

**Figure 18. Cross-tabulation of 'where deployed' and 'worst thing'**

### 3. Deployment Particulars

The three questions addressed in this section are grouped together because each one helps to understand the reservist's attitude prior to deployment and how they were managed during pre-deployment and deployment status. The prior notification issue is relevant because frustrations about deploying often begin before deployment. It is important to understand that the majority of the respondents wanted to be deployed. This indicates that it is not solely the deployment that prompts reservists to leave, but elements of the deployment experience that motivate the turnover. Lastly, the perception of being underutilized or overworked is reflected by the answers to the question, "Did you have enough to do?" Figures 19 – 21 display the responses.




Figure 19. Question 14a-How much notice did you receive?




Figure 20. Question 14b-Did you want to go?




Figure 21. Question 13b-Did you have enough to do?

One respondent who answered that there was nothing to do shared this information as well, "We were bored to tears. They sent twice as many as they needed because they expected lots of drop outs!" On the other end of the spectrum, another reservist said, "Enough to do? Hey, I worked postal and we never stopped!" This questioning scheme

uncovers answers that relate directly to the involvement, reinforcement, and demotivator segments of the Integrated Turnover Model.

## **2. Personal Effects of Deployment**

Before each reservist was questioned about the specific effects that deployment had on various aspects of their personal lives, each was asked the following question, “What was the worst thing about the deployment?” This question was seeking ‘gut’ level initial reactions. Next, each respondent was asked to relate the “best thing” about the deployment. Respondents were then asked why they left their units. Lastly, a series of questions were asked to uncover the effects of deployment on lifestyle.

Figure 22 depicts responses to the question, “What was the worst thing about your deployment?” and Figure 23 shows responses to the question, “What was the best thing about your deployment?” Refer to Figure 1 for examples of leadership problem responses. Second and third choice response for ‘worst thing’ and ‘best thing’ questions can be found in Appendix C.




Figure 22. Question 17a-What was the worst thing about your deployment?





Figure 23. Question 16a-What was the best thing about your deployment?

As shown in Figure 23, nearly a quarter of the respondents left the reserves because their obligations had been fulfilled. In order to better understand the decision not to reenlist, each of the respondents who left because of fulfilled obligations were asked why

they did not continue with their reserve careers. Half (six of twelve) said they did not want to be deployed again. In keeping with the first choice responses, two said they had problems with their civilian jobs, two voiced concerns with leadership, and two said family separation was too difficult for them to contend with. Results of second and third choice responses are in Appendix C.



**Figure 24. Question 15a-Why did you leave your unit?**

To better understand what is meant by ‘leadership’ problems, Table 1 provides a list of quotes from those respondents that cited this reason for leaving.

### **Quotes About Leadership Problems**

1. It wasn't worth doing, all the officers didn't care for us, didn't take care of us.
2. I had problems with the chain of command, too many people trying to be the boss.
3. There was no military bearing in the unit so I went back to the Special Forces.
4. Lack of leadership. The first sergeant and the CO didn't get along. The first sergeant's wife was in the same unit so the females got special treatment!
5. I wasn't pleased with the chain of command. It was a 'good old boy' system. They didn't know what they were doing.
6. Too much BS
7. Bad chain of command. No discipline. Too much fooling around. Prostitutes in the tents and everyone knew it. CO was cheating on his wife too. There was lot's of adultery.
8. I had problems with my Sergeant. He was cheating on his wife and I was a friend to both of them at home. I just couldn't face her when we got back.

**Table 1. Quotations from interviews that cited 'leadership problems' as the primary reason for leaving unit.**

The last series of questions explored how the deployment affected five specific areas of personal lifestyle: family, finances, civilian job, schooling, and Reserve career.

Answers to these lifestyle questions were most revealing for understanding the primary research question, "How much of enlisted Army Reservists' decisions to leave can be attributed to deployments?"

It is common knowledge that soldiers miss their families during long separations. This study underscores that fact with six out of ten respondents relating that the deployment had a negative effect on their families. Neutral responses were garnered from the remaining respondents. These numbers reflect the married and single statistics of the respondents respectively, suggesting that deployment is more difficult for married soldiers.



Financial problems are thought to be one of the greatest burdens of being a deployed reservist, yet this study reveals that slightly more respondents experienced enhanced financial situations as a result of deployment (16 reported favorable finances and 15 reported financial difficulties). In summary, finance was a non-issue for four out of ten respondents.

Problems with civilian jobs were most often attributed to lost seniority and training opportunities. Only one respondent reported actually losing his job because of his deployment. Overall, 29 percent of the respondents said that the deployment had a negative effect on their civilian job and 58 percent reported no effect. Two respondents reported a positive effect because they were able to bolster their job resumes with the experience and training they received while deployed.

Of the 24 respondents who reported being enrolled in some type of school or training program at the time of deployment, ten said the deployment had a negative effect on their education. The main cause of this ill effect was lost time, which forced many to delay graduation dates. Thirteen respondents reported no effects and one respondent reported a positive effect of deployment, "It made me appreciate what I had in school, so I reapplied myself when I got home and made the Dean's List!"

Lastly, when asked how the deployment affected their reserve careers, half (26 of 52) reported a negative effect, one third (17 of 52) said it had no effect, and 15 percent (8 of 52) reported a positive effect. In other words, deployment harms or has no effect on a reservists career according to 75 percent of the respondents in this study.


## I. RESPONDENT SUGGESTIONS

Figure 25 illustrates that of 52 reservists, 15 recommended that leadership provide better pre-deployment briefs. Eleven reservists suggested that leaders need better training. Besides the type of complaints registered in Table 1, many reservists believe that the officers have far too little 'real experience'. Most said that their commanding officers had never experienced a deployment and many believed that these officers never experienced any type of opportunity to lead soldiers. One reservist said, "My CO probably never even went camping as a kid."

Six respondents said that leadership should do a better job keeping the soldiers fit. It is perceived by some that many soldiers are not physically qualified to deploy because of weight standards and dental problems. As one respondent related the problem, "If a guy doesn't want to go, all he has to do is eat more Twinkies." Five reservists said that better deployment notice would be very helpful. Invariably, when asked how much notice they received, each respondent gave two answers. First, they heard a rumor of pending deployment, then they received official notification. The rumored notification was almost always at least two months before the actual notification and the rumor always turned out to be true. As one reservist wondered, "I don't know why they just can't be straight with us."

Four respondents called for better family support. One reservist wished to remind leadership that most reservists don't live near Army bases and therefore are not afforded all the support services offered to the families of the active duty soldiers. "Sometimes I think they forget that we don't live on base," he said. Finally, three respondents said leaders should ask for volunteers for deployment, while two reservists suggested that

leaders should make sure that the deployment is really necessary. This last sentiment relates back to the question ‘did you have enough to do’ where one-fourth of the respondents reported that they did not have enough to do, or nothing to do at all. Second and third choice responses are displayed in Appendix C.



**Figure 25. Question 37-What suggestions do you have for reserve leadership to make soldier’s deployment experiences better?**

Discussions and conclusions from these data are provided in Chapter VI. Specifically, the data presented for each subsidiary research question are analyzed and interpreted to assist leaders in understanding ways to improve reservist performance and reduce turnover due to deployment.

## **VI. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND DISCUSSION**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

Chapter V displayed the results from 52 telephone interviews conducted with reservists who left the service after deployment. This chapter uses the interview data to answer primary and subsidiary research questions posed in this study. Conclusions are drawn in the next section. Each conclusion is followed by a brief recommendation for ways to reduce turnover of reservists after deployment. The discussion phase of this chapter is provided to support and enhance the conclusion findings. Finally, areas for future research are discussed.

### **B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The following conclusions and recommendations are based on telephone interviews with 52 post-deployment, prior Army reservists. Execution of these recommendations should reduce turnover among enlisted reservists who have experienced a deployment.

**1. Conclusion:** Reservists are generally frustrated because the "rumor" deployment date tends to be "real", and this element of miscommunication is confusing.

**Conclusion:** Reservists do not receive sufficient information about destination living or working conditions prior to deployment.

**Recommendation:** Provide reservists with timely and accurate deployment information. Providing deploying reservists with departure dates as soon as they are known would minimize the stress and confusion brought on by rumors. Likewise, reservists should be appraised of the type of work they will be doing upon arrival to their

deployment destination and given information about the living conditions. Reservists receiving scant or misleading information begin their deployment experience distrusting their leadership.

a. Deployment timelines made available to reservists should be passed on to civilian employers. This would help reservists maintain professional relationships with their employers. Accurate timelines also aid families in planning for change of residence, schooling, and spousal employment issues.

b. Realistic job and living condition previews would help reservists better prepare for the deployment. Appropriate tools and personal items could then be brought along to better support the reserve mission and the reservist's quality of life.

**2. Conclusion:** Reservists' training is not aligned with deployment requirements.

**Recommendation:** Review reserve unit training plans. Training at the reserve unit level needs to better simulate possible contingency missions. As deployments to underdeveloped countries become more frequent, reservists should be better trained to operate in Third-World conditions. Basic field conditions should be simulated at the reserve units. In addition, reservists need to regularly train with the tools and equipment they will actually use when deployed. Many respondents reported being completely surprised with new or different tools and equipment at deployment sites. This unfamiliarity with equipment impairs efficiency and degrades morale.

**3. Conclusion:** Manning levels for reserves at deployment sites have too much variation, from excessive to sparse.

**Recommendation:** Refine manning plans. The findings suggest that half of the deployed reservists were mismanaged in the area of manning levels. Some sites had

too many assigned reservists, while other sites had too few. With many deployment locations becoming long-term obligations, utilization statistics should be readily available. In turn, this information could be used to better disseminate reserve assets. Both overworked and underemployed personnel expressed morale problems which adversely affected turnover decisions.

**4. Conclusion:** Some of the reserves said too much of their time is wasted at mobilization sites.

**Recommendation:** Study the feasibility of deploying reservists from home station sites, rather than sending reservists to mobilization sites. Mobilization sites are set up to handle large numbers of deploying soldiers, both reserve and active duty. In many instances, active duty are given "head of line" privilege, causing reserve soldiers to wait days and weeks before processing for deployment. Because reserve records, both medical and training, are often not readily available upon arrival at mobilization sites, reservists often must repeat prerequisite training and medical examinations. Conducting all predeployment briefing, training, and medical examinations at home stations could save time and money. Additionally, reserve soldiers could spend less time away from home.

**5. Conclusion:** Many junior reserve officers are not prepared to lead troops on lengthy deployments.

**Conclusion:** Enlisted reservists strongly desire more discipline and military bearing in their units.

**Recommendation:** Emphasize basic troop leadership skills in junior reserve officer training. General leadership and managerial skills should be emphasized in

reserve junior officer training. Respondents perceived leadership deficiencies on the part of their reserve officers. Leaders were often described as self-serving and inexperienced. Training and education needs to stress the importance of good military order, especially during deployments. Moreover, the benefits and costs of high quality and low quality leadership behaviors respectively, need to be articulated and emphasized repeatedly. Annual training seminars in troop relations, ethics and morals, and general management skills should be mandatory for all junior reserve officers. Leaders at the troop level serve as ambassadors of the organization. If even a few of these leaders are perceived as inadequate, soldiers lose confidence. Loss of confidence of juniors towards their seniors was the most revealing aspect of this study.

**6. Conclusion:** Enlisted reservists said that inferior moral conduct observed in some of their officers degrades morale, and in some cases, influenced their decision to leave.

**Recommendation:** Implement a multipronged approach to improve moral conduct consistently across the Reserve officer corps.

- a. Provide more meaningful training and education modules prior to deployment.
- b. Revise incentive and discipline procedures, clearly articulated and emphasized, to improve the behavior of reserve officers.
- c. Employ a feedback mechanism to solicit perceptions of post-deployment troops so the leadership system can incorporate lessons-learned.

**7. Conclusion:** Enlisted reservists perceive second-class citizenship bestowed on them from many active duty members.

**Recommendation:** Make changes to enhance 'Total Force' integration policy. In 1997, the Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen sent a policy memorandum to the civilian and military leadership of the Department of Defense calling upon them to eliminate "all residual barriers – structural and cultural" to effective integration of the Reserve and Active components into a "seamless Total Force." Recognizing the increased reliance on the nation's reserve forces, Cohen defined integration as the "conditions of readiness and trust needed for leadership, at all levels, to have well-justified confidence that Reserve component units are trained and equipped to serve as an effective part of the joint and combined forces — in peace and war."

Emphasis must be placed on adhering to the following principles delineated by Secretary Cohen: clearly understood responsibility for, and ownership of, the Total Force by senior leadership; clear and mutual understanding on the mission of each unit – Active, Guard and Reserve; and commitment to provide the resources needed to accomplish assigned missions.

## **C. DISCUSSION**

The discussion includes implications and answers to the subsidiary research questions, and final comments on the primary research question. The research questions are organized according to the Integrated Turnover Model presented in Chapter III. As mentioned previously, the reservists included in the sample are those who have left their units after a deployment within the last three years.

### **1. Subsidiary Research Questions**

#### Involvement

- a. *What are the reservists' feelings toward the reasons for deployment?*



In general, the respondents discounted any personal thoughts or opinions about the reasons or politics that led to their deployment. The overwhelming majority responded as would be expected of professional soldiers; relating that it was not their position to question the reasons for the actions of their country, only to follow the orders of the Commander in Chief.

*b. Is the reservist able to commit to the mission, regardless of personal feelings?*

Eighty-three percent of the reservists reported that they were committed to the deployment mission. Even those that may have initially questioned the reasons for deployment, or the politics of U.S. involvement, said that once they arrived at their deployment destinations, they did their best to do a good job and to help accomplish the mission. This indicates that if reservists had a better understanding of what their roles were going to be and how their mission aids in the overall mission of the deployment, negative attitudes during the pre-deployment phase could be minimized and greater buy-in would likely be attained.

Demotivators

*a. How well did leadership assist in removing task/mission "roadblocks"?*

Reservists answered positively and negatively to this question in equal numbers. Twenty-three of fifty-two reported that their leaders did a good job in removing difficulties that interfered with job performance and twenty-three reported that leadership did not do their best to remove the difficulties experienced by reservists on deployment. The value of leadership participation and involvement in the daily operations of the deployed reservist was prevalent throughout the interview responses.

Interestingly, a large majority of the respondents (44 of 52) reported that leadership provided adequate job guidance and that reservists understood what had to be done to accomplish the task. Because of the reported transient nature of a reservist's assignments and the disparaging attitudes of many active duty soldiers towards the reserve soldier, every enlisted and officer leader should be actively working to remove the perception of second-class citizenship bestowed on reserve soldiers.

*b. Was leadership powerless to aid reservists in task/mission accomplishment?*

The respondents generally viewed reserve leadership as ill-prepared to command reserves on deployment. There were references to displays of inferior moral behavior on the part of some reserve officers. Respondents seemed to attribute poor leadership skills to insufficient training. Specifically, junior officers appear to need a more thorough understanding of basic leadership skills and troop relations.

*c. What are the effects of deployment on a reservist's personal life e.g., family, finances, civilian job, school, and reserve career?*

Fifty-eight percent of the respondents reported that deployment had a negative effect on their families. The number one complaint was that the family missed the soldier. Thirty-eight percent reported that the deployment had no effect on their families. However, more than half of these neutral respondents were single at the time of deployment. While family separation is a hardship suffered by all soldiers on deployment, it appears that reservists accept this aspect of deployment and that family separation is not a major determinant of turnover. In fact, when asked why they left their units, only one respondent reported that family separation motivated him to leave.

Financially, respondents reported in nearly equal amounts, positive and negative financial repercussions of deployment. Thirty-one percent reported a positive effect on finances and twenty-nine percent reported negative effects. Thirty-eight percent reported no effect on their finances. Only three reservists reported leaving their units because of financial hardship. Finance does not surface as a primary cause of turnover.

Deployment does have an impact on the civilian jobs of reservists. Current laws are doing a good job in preventing reservists from losing their jobs when deployed but they do not protect reservists from missed training or promotion opportunities. Of the 15 reservists who reported a negative effect of deployment on their civilian employment, only one said that she lost her job. The majority reported that the lost time on the job caused them to miss promotions and pay raises. When asked why they left their unit, 12 percent said because of negative impacts on their civilian jobs. This finding suggests that current laws be reviewed to address areas of more subtle job discrimination.

Seventy-nine percent of the reservists interviewed reported that deployment had no effect or a neutral effect on their educational pursuits. Of the ten respondents who reported a negative effect, delayed graduation plans was the overwhelming complaint. All respondents who were attending school at the time of deployment returned to school when the deployment ended. However, three of these respondents reported leaving their units to pursue full-time education. School interruption seems to have little bearing on reserve turnover.

Fifty percent of the respondents reported that the deployment had a negative effect on their reserve career. The deployment experience convinced those reservists at a career decision point, such as retirement eligibility or reenlistment, not to continue their reserve

careers. When these 26 respondents were asked why they left their units, nine of them reported either poor leadership or lack of training, and not working in their MOS as the reason for leaving. Many people join the reserve for job training. They become dissatisfied for two reasons: they do not receive expected training, or they are not given the opportunity to work in disciplines for which they were trained. If greater emphasis were placed on ensuring that meaningful training takes place on drill weekends and that reservists are assigned jobs they have trained for, fewer reservists would choose to leave. Additionally, more people may be enticed to join. The notion that the only thing reservists do on training weekends is play cards is still alive in civilian society and was declared as fact by several respondents.

#### Equity

##### *a. How well has the concept of 'Total Force' been implemented?*

The general feeling among reservists in this study is they are treated like second-class soldiers. Many reported receiving second-rate or "leftover" supplies and equipment. In some cases, they received no gear because of shortages, or because of perceptions that gear was unnecessary. An example of this is a reported instance where the reservists of a particular postal unit had to purchase their own cold weather gear, boots and parkas, because they were told they were not going to be deployed long enough to receive these items from the government. As reported earlier, 85 percent of the respondents were deployed for six months or longer. Many mechanics reported the same type of situation pertaining to the availability of tools. Most respondents reported the unfortunate feeling of not being accepted by the mainstream Army.

##### *b. Do reservists perceive inequities because of their reserve status?*

In summary, the answer is yes. Respondents were quick to mention that not living near Army bases tended to make them feel forgotten when various support services were discussed. They felt that their families received inadequate support when they were deployed because the Army did not reach out beyond the physical boundaries of the Army bases. Respondents wanted to remind leadership that there are many families that were in need of these services who could not travel the sometimes hundreds of miles necessary to reach an Army base. Reservists reported that follow-up medical care was neglected for reservists returning from deployment for the same reason mentioned previously, reservists are not necessarily situated near Army bases.

Perhaps most importantly, reservists invariably reported they felt “looked down upon” and felt they needed to prove themselves to the regular soldiers. The respondents felt there was a superior-inferior division between the active duty and reserve forces.

#### Reinforcement

*a. Did leadership support the reservists, enabling them to complete their tasks to the best of their abilities?*

Thirty-four percent of the reservists reported they received adequate job support while twenty-seven percent felt they did not receive adequate job support. This question is closely related to the question asked in another section of the survey, “Do you think that leadership did their best to remove any difficulties that may have made your job more difficult?” Forty-four percent said yes and forty-four percent said no to this question. The subtle difference between these two questions and the ensuing answers helps distinguish the difference between those who viewed leadership as just performing adequately, and those who perceived leadership as doing an above average or below

average job. The answers to each question suggest that reservists desired more assistance and positive intervention from leadership.

*b. Did reservists receive job performance feedback from leadership that enabled them to perform their jobs better?*

Fifty-eight percent of the respondents reported they received feedback from leadership that helped them do a better job. Thirty-one percent said they received no feedback of any type. Of those who responded yes, most said they were usually addressed when they were doing something wrong. Only two respondents reported receiving praise for a job well-done. Again, indications of the interviews suggest more time be invested in leadership training, especially in the area of troop relations, core values, and management.

#### Relevance of Reward

*a. Did deployment awards serve to motivate reservists?*

Eighty-eight percent of deployed reservists received some type of award for deployment. This reinforces the sentiment that the Army may be handing out awards to reservists who have deployed without careful regard to merit. While forty-six percent of those who received awards said that they were motivated by the award, forty percent said the award did not motivate them because "everyone got one". As alluded to earlier, reservists call this 'blanket awarding'. This type of award management suboptimizes the motivational value of the award system which should be reviewed.

*b. What kinds of awards do reservists think are desirable?*

Thirty-eight percent reported that if the current award system were used as they believe it was initially intended, it would be a good motivational tool. Another popular

response, 12 percent, said that just being told that they did a good job would have been a tremendous motivator, (another indication for meaningful leadership training). Two other popular responses included requests for Army Commendation Medals (ARCOMS) and money. Since ARCOMS count as points for promotion, and promotion leads to pay raises, consideration should be given to giving awards that have a recognizable tangible value.

### Goals

*Did leadership make clear the goal/purpose of the jobs?*

While most reservists reported that they understood the goal and purpose of their assignments, many said that this understanding did not occur until they arrived at their deployment destinations. They stressed that gaining better knowledge of the job they were going to (pre-deployment brief) would have decreased the amount of anxiety they experienced before leaving for deployment. Moreover, they may have been more enthusiastic about the deployment if they better understood their roles in the mission. Leadership should make a greater effort to share all relevant information with the troops. The value of a thorough pre-deployment brief is immense according to many respondents.

## **2. Primary Research Question**

*How much of enlisted Army Reservists' decisions to leave can be attributed to deployments?*

There are many factors that influence reservists to leave their units. Family separation is often mentioned as a hardship, but it is probably not the strongest factor influencing post-deployment turnover. Most of the respondents were experienced

soldiers aware of the stresses of separation. Yet, despite the known likelihood of family separation, they still pursued their military careers. It was other elements surrounding deployment that greatly influenced turnover decisions.

The most influential determinant of post-deployment turnover is concerns about leadership. Reservists identified deficiencies in each of the six factors of the Integrated Turnover Model that can be attributed to leadership inadequacies. These precursors to turnover are: lack of information, mismanagement of reserve manpower, poor leadership skills, and inequitable treatment of reserve by active duty soldiers.

#### **D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

This study focused on the factors which influence enlisted reservists, who upon return from a deployment, decide to leave their units. Further research is necessary to identify factors which influence a reservist to remain in the Army Reserve after experiencing a deployment. Information gained from a study of this nature could provide information to more fully understand the dynamics of reserve turnover. Additionally, research needs to address the problems of successful reserve leadership behavior, alignment of training with mission requirements, and communication processes between active and reserve personnel.

Research could be conducted on turnover in other Reserve components to determine the strengths and weaknesses of their programs. Studying alternative programs may yield new policies to help retain high quality reservists beyond their deployments, where their experience increases in value to the Army.



## **E. FINAL CONCLUSION**

Enlisted soldiers are leaving the Army Reserve at high rates. These losses reduce readiness and place a greater strain on remaining unit members, and increase overall costs of maintaining Army reserves. Although this study focused on reasons influencing reservists' decisions to leave after deployment, it is important to note that many of the respondents expressed pride and personal value from their experience in the Army reserves.

The study addressed the turnover problem by asking 52 prior reservists specific questions about what they think. Fifty-two respondents do not necessarily reflect the opinions and motivations of all reservists who left their units after a deployment. However, the data are sufficient to draw reasonable conclusions that may positively impact the reserve turnover problem. An additional limitation is the interpretation of respondents perceptions. In short, individual bias is always present. Ultimately, recommendations offered in the study can be used to improve the turnover problem and strengthen the combat effectiveness of the United States Army.

## **APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL**

### **ARMY RESERVE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS**

My name is \_\_\_\_\_. I am a student at a graduate school of management.

We've been asked by the Army Reserve to talk to some reservists who deployed and then left their unit to find out the reasons, and what can be done to improve retention. I'm writing my thesis and all information is anonymous. Could you take a few minutes to talk to me confidentially about your experiences?

#### **BACKGROUND**

1. Survey Identification number:
2. Rank:
3. MOS:
4. Married:
5. Children:
6. Education level:
7. Civilian Employment:
8. Time in reserve:
9. PS/NPS:

#### **CIRCUMSTANCE OF DEPLOYMENT**

10. Where deployed (How many):
11. When deployed:
12. How long:
- 13a. Work in your MOS:
- 13b. Did you have enough to do:

14a. How much notice:

14b. Did you want to go:

15a. Why did you leave your unit:

15b. (second reason)

15c. (third reason)

### **PERSONAL EFFECTS OF DEPLOYMENT**

16a. What was the best thing about the deployment:

16b. (second best)

16c. (third best)

17a. What was the worst thing about the deployment:

17b. (second worst)

17c. (third worst)

18. Did the deployment have any effects on your:

a. Family:

b. Finances:

c. Civilian job:

d. School:

e. Reserve career:

### **CONTRACT ISSUES**

19. Do you feel that being deployed in a 'peacetime' operation was part of your reserve obligation:

20. Did you have to give back any money (e.g., college tuition, retention bonus, etc.) when you left your unit:

## **INTEGRATED TURNOVER MODEL ELEMENTS**

### **INVOLVEMENT:**

- 21. Did you support the reasons for your deployment (yes, somewhat/mixed, no):
- 22. Did you feel committed to the mission (yes, somewhat/mixed, no):

### **DEMOTIVATORS:**

- 23. Do you think that leadership did their best to remove any difficulties (within their control) that may have made your job more difficult—if not, what could they have done:

### **EQUITY:**

- 24. Do you feel that you and other reservists, those doing the same job on deployment, were evaluated equally:
- 25. Do you feel that you and active duty, those doing the same job on deployment, were evaluated equally:
- 26. Were performance expectations the same for you and those doing similar work:

### **REINFORCEMENT:**

- 27. Do you feel that leadership provided adequate job guidance (did you understand what was expected of you while performing your job):
- 28. Do you feel you had adequate support from leadership to ensure you could perform your job to the best of your ability:
- 29. Do you feel you received adequate performance feedback from leadership:

**RELEVANCE OF REWARD:**

- 30. Did you receive an award for your deployment efforts:
- 31. If yes, did you feel it was a good form of recognition for your efforts:
- 32. Do you think this type of award serves as an inspiration for top performance and maximum effort:
- 33. What kind of awards do you think would be desirable to reservists who have served on deployment:

**GOALS:**

- 34. Did you understand what the specific goal of your task or job was while on deployment:
- 35. Did leadership make clear what actions, tasks, and/or jobs needed to be done to accomplish the goal:
- 36. Did leadership ever suggest that awards would be given if the job/task/mission were completed as desired by the leadership:

**FINAL THOUGHTS:**

- 38. What suggestions do you have for reserve leadership to make deployments better?

Thanks for your time. Your comments have been very helpful.

## APPENDIX B. CODESHEET

### CODE SHEET

(N/A or information missing = 9, other = 8)

<i>Response</i>	<i>Question</i>	<i>Description</i>
_____	1	Survey identification number
_____	2	Rank: E1=1, E2=2, E3=3, E4=4, E5=5, E6=6, E7=7
_____	3	MOS: MP=1, postal clerk=2, admin.=3, mechanic=4, psych. ops.= 4a, medical= 5, ammunition=6, intell=7, civil affairs=10, infantry=11, cook=12,
_____	4	Marital Status: married=1, single=2
_____	5	Children: none=1, 1 child=2, 2 children=3, 3 children=4, over 3 children=4
_____	6	Education: H.S.=1, some college=2, Associates=3, BA=4, MA=5
_____	7	Civilian Occupation: agriculture, forestry, fishing=1, mining=2, construction=3, manufacturing=4, trans/public utilities=5, retail trade=6, finance, insurance, real estate=7, services=10, public protection=11, unemployed=12, student=13, self-employed=14, medical=15
_____	8	Time in reserve at last deployment: less than 1yr.=1, 1yr. but less than 2yr.=2, 2yr. but less than 3yr. =3, 3yr. but less than 4yr.=4, 4yr. or more =5
_____	9	Prior service?: yes=1, no=2
_____	10	Location of deployment: Bosnia=1, Germany=2, USA=3
_____	11	Year deployed: 1994=1, 1995=2, 1996=3, 1997=4
_____	12	How long deployed?: Less than 4 mo.'s =1, 4 mo.'s but less than 6 mo.'s =2, 6 mo.'s or more =3
_____	13a.	Work in MOS?: yes=1, no=2, partial=3
_____	13b.	Enough to do?: too much=1, enough=2, not enough=3, nothing to do=4

**CODE SHEET** (pg. 2)

(N/A or information missing = 9, other = 8)

<u>Response</u>	<u>Question</u>	<u>Description</u>
_____	14a.	How much notice?: less than 48 hrs.=1, 49 hrs. to 1 wk.=2, 8 days to 3 wks.=3, 22 days to 6 wks.=4, more than 6 wks. =5
_____	14b.	Want to go?: yes=1, no=2, mixed=3
_____	15a.	Why leave unit?: family separation=1, job conflict=2, poor leadership=3, difficult to promote=4, too far/disbanded=5, school conflict=6, finance problems=7, retire/end of obligation=10, transfer to other military component=11, training/lack of use of MOS=12, fear of/actual deployments=13
_____	15b.	
_____	15c.	
_____	16a.	Best thing about deployment?: travel=1, money=2, work in MOS=3, learn new culture=4, comraderie=5, help others=6, stay in USA=7
_____	16b.	
_____	16c.	
_____	17a.	Worst thing about deployment?: family separation=1, poor leadership=2, money problems=3, living conditions=4, working conditions=5, not trained for job=6, nothing to do/boredom=7
_____	17b.	
_____	17c.	
_____	18a.	Did deployment have any effects on your family?: positive=1, negative=2, neutral=3, mixed=4, N/A=5
_____	18b.	Did deployment have any effects on your finances?: positive=1, negative=2, neutral=3, mixed=4
_____	18c.	Did deployment have any effects on your civilian job?: positive=1, negative=2, neutral=3, mixed=4, N/A=5
_____	18d.	Did deployment have any effects on your school?: positive=1, negative=2, neutral=3, mixed=4, N/A=5
_____	18e.	Did deployment have any effects on your Reserve career?: positive=1, negative=2, neutral=3, mixed=4

\_\_\_\_\_ 19 Peacetime operation a Reserve obligation?: yes=1,  
no=2, mixed=3

\_\_\_\_\_ 20 Give back money?: yes=1, no=2

**CODE SHEET** (pg.3)

(N/A or information missing = 9, other = 8)

<i>Response</i>	<i>Question</i>	<i>Description</i>
_____	21	Support deployment reasons?: yes=1, no=2, mixed=3
_____	22	Committed to mission?: yes=1, no=2, mixed=3
_____	23	Leadership remove difficulties?: yes=1, no=2, mixed=3
_____	24	All reservists evaluated equally?: yes=1, no=2, mixed=3
_____	25	Reservists and Active Duty evaluated equally?: yes=1, no=2, mixed=3
_____	26	Performance expectations same for those doing similar work?: yes=1, no=2, mixed=3
_____	27	Leadership provide adequate job guidance?: yes=1, no=2, mixed=3
_____	28	Adequate job support from leadership?: yes=1, no=2, mixed=3
_____	29	Adequate performance feedback from leadership?: yes=1, no=2, mixed=3
_____	30	Receive award?: yes=1, no=2
_____	31	If yes, good form of recognition?: yes=1, no=2, mixed=3
_____	32	Do these awards inspire top performance?: yes=1, no=2, mixed=3
_____	33	What kind of awards would be desirable?: current system if used correctly=1, money=2, promotions=3, VA points=4, no 'blanket' awards=5, ARCOM=6, someone say "good job"=7, joint/NATO awards=10




_____	34	Understand goal of job/task?: yes=1, no=2, mixed=3
_____	35	Leadership make job/task to be done clear? yes=1, no=2, mixed=3

**CODE SHEET** (pg.4)


(N/A or information missing = 9, other = 8)

<i><b>Response</b></i>	<i><b>Question</b></i>	<i><b>Description</b></i>
_____	36	Leadership suggest awards?: yes=1, no=2, mixed=3
_____	37a.	Suggestions to improve soldier's deployment experience?: give VA pts.=1, ease promotion
_____	37b.	reqs.=2, family support=3, give accurate/truthful pre-deploy brief=4, train leadership to lead=5,
_____	37c.	eliminate AD prejudice of Reservists=6, give better notice=7, keep soldiers fit for deployment=10, ask for volunteers=11, keep paperwork up-to-date=12, ensure deployment necessary=13


## APPENDIX C. FREQUENCY REPRESENTATIONS




2. Rank?




3. MOS?




4. Marital status?




5. Have children?




6. Education level?




7. Civilian occupation?




8. How much time in Reserve?




9. Have prior service?




11. Year deployed?




12. Length of deployment?




13a. Work in MOS?




13b. Did you have enough to do?




14a. How much notice did you receive?




14b. Did you want to go?




15a. Why did you leave your unit?




15b. Why leave (b)?




15c. Why leave (c)?



16a. What was the best thing about the deployment?




16b. Best thing (b)?




16c. Best thing (c)?







17a. What was the worst thing about the deployment?




17b. Worst thing (b)?




17c. Worst thing (c)?




18a. Did deployment have any effects on your family?




18b. Did deployment have any effects on your finance?




18c. Did deployment have any effects on your civilian job?




18d. Did deployment have any effects on your school?




18e. Did deployment have any effect on your Reserve career?




19. Peacetime operations a part of Reserve obligation?




20. Did you have to give back any money?




21. Did you support the reasons for deployment?




22. Were you committed to the mission?




23. Did leadership do their best to remove difficulties?




24. Were reservists evaluated equally?




25. Were Reservists and Active Duty evaluated equally?




26. Performance expectations the same for those doing similar work?




27. Did leadership provide adequate job guidance?




28. Did you receive adequate job support from leadership?




29. Did you receive adequate performance feedback from leadership?



30. Did you receive an award?




31. If yes, was this a good form of recognition?




32. Do these awards inspire top performance?







33. What kinds of awards would be desirable?




34. Did you understand the goal of the job/task?




35. Did leadership make job/task to be done clear?




36. Did leadership ever suggest awards would be given?



37a. What suggestions do you have for leadership to improve deployment experiences?



37b. Suggestions (b)?



37c. Suggestions (c)?

## LIST OF REFERENCES

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